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Michael Gehler has long been recognized on both sides of the Atlantic as a leading historian of international relations and diplomatic history. His From Saint-Germain to Lisbon is an updated edition of
Österreichs Weg in die Europäische Union (Innsbruck, 2009)—a kind of “everything you’d want to
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know about Austrian integration into European institutions,” including fits and starts, failures and
successes. It is a massive tome: 933 pages of detailed narrative, plus another 210 pages devoted to
100 primary sources (speeches, Austrian Foreign Ministry and foreign documents, treaties, and position papers).
Systematic chronological presentation begins with World War I and the First Republic’s attempts to
adapt after the Treaty of St. Germain dismantled the Habsburg Empire. Gehler takes up a series of key
initiatives that include the pan-European vision advanced by Richard von Coudenhove-Calergi, Ignaz
Seipel’s notion of a broader Central European confederation, and the Curtius-Schober effort to form
an Austro-German customs union. He shows clearly how each of these ventures met with resistance
from the empire’s successor states, the League of Nations, and, particularly, former enemies such as
Italy and France.
Gehler is at his best when he picks up the narrative after the Nazi regime’s defeat. He acknowledges
the difficulties Austria’s coalition partners faced negotiating a host of challenges: four-power occupation; attempts to instrumentalize the Moscow Declaration’s statement on Austria as first victim of Nazi
aggression (the Opferthese); Marshall Plan assistance; coordination with the European Payments
Union; and, with the State Treaty that ended postwar occupation in 1955, permanent neutrality—all
without antagonizing the Soviet Union or drawing too close to potential Western partners. Austrian
leaders enjoyed hard-won success positioning the Second Republic for integrative contact points
with the emerging ECSC, OEEC, and the Council of Europe, and with membership in the
European Free Trade Association. These steps involved difficulties of their own, especially given the
1956 Hungarian and 1968 Czechoslovak crises, ongoing disagreements with Italy over South Tyrol,
lingering French suspicions, and Austrian concerns about West German economic hegemony.
Austria’s ability to work with other European neutrals where practical and yet pursue its own distinct interests vis-à-vis Western European institutions marked Second Republic foreign policy from the
1960s through the end of the Cold War. Gehler skillfully treats Bruno Kreisky’s efforts as foreign minister—and later as chancellor—to position Austria as a site for East-West dialogue, on the one hand,
and for enhanced cooperation with the European Community and other supranational western institutions, on the other. The fall of the Iron Curtain allowed for a certain degree of continuity in foreign
policy; Austria could capitalize on an established position as the easternmost of western states but proceed as an honest broker during the Yugoslav civil war and the Kosovo conflict. An orientation toward
regional stability, peace, human rights, and economic cooperation characterized Austrian policy
through the 1990s and beyond. Even as it assumed membership in the European Union, observer status with the Western European Union defense organization, and a consultative role with NATO,
Austria preserved its neutrality.
The encyclopedic volume showcases Gehler’s strengths as a diplomatic and international
historian—he designates his approach as source-based, “basic research” through which history “can
continue to exist as an innovative discipline” (18). In the same breath, he is critical of theoretical
approaches that he refers to, in blanket terms, as “cultural studies” and “postmodern.” While no
historian would dispute that source-based research is the cornerstone of our discipline, one can
profitably—even innovatively—interrogate the power dynamics inherent in the formulation of policies
and promulgation of decrees or proclamations. Gehler’s rejection of other approaches to interpreting
sources creates an either/or dichotomy rather than a both/and approach that would allow social and
cultural considerations to inform diplomatic history.
Thus, Gehler’s politicians and diplomats during both republics operate almost entirely independent
of concerns and pressures from the population. Exceptions are limited to growing unease about potential challenges to Austrian neutrality during the later Cold War years, the two-thirds favorable vote
with respect to Austria’s EU membership (892–94), or popular responses regarding the European
Union’s attitude toward the post-1999 ÖVP-FPÖ coalition (749ff). Notably, he offers two summary
statements: “What was favorable for the building of an Austrian identity was the socioeconomic development that was connected with the economic reconstruction after 1945, the Marshall Plan, the establishment of the social partnership in the domestic policy, and the foundation of neutrality in foreign
policy”; and “Elite self-interest and public self-perception intermeshed with each other and led to an

instrumental politicization and a cultural interpretation” (911). These concessions notwithstanding,
Gehler sees state identity formation—understood as a neutral, European, democratic republic uniquely
situated between East and West—as a purely elite exercise rather than as a negotiation between constituents and their economic, cultural, or political representatives. (To be fair, he acknowledges the
importance of industrial, agricultural, and trade union lobbies for Austrian policy making with respect
to EFTA and later EU negotiations, but largely in passing). As a result, Gehler’s commendably meticulous account takes place in ministerial offices, plenary sessions, and conversations between diplomatic
elites (as recalled in memoirs or in interviews).
As impressive as this book is, its intended audience is unclear. Only readers initiated into the intricacies of Austrian domestic affairs will appreciate underlying issues. Biographical sketches appear designated for those unfamiliar with Austrian history. The impressive annex of primary sources is not
referenced in the text, and sources are not annotated. German-language sources are not translated,
whereas the book itself has been. The translation is highly problematic—it is rendered almost entirely
in the passive voice, there are problems with syntax, plurals, capitalization, and even outright inaccuracies. This results in what many will find a laborious reading experience, one that would have been
smoother in the original German.
In the end, the work would have benefited significantly from a clearer sense of audience, closer editorial supervision, and greater attention to translation. This is unfortunate; readers may find that the
limits of presentation work at cross purposes to appreciation of the topic. Still, those interested in
diplomatic history and high politics will find much of value in Gehler’s volume, even with the
challenges identified.

